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SOBIE*
White Plains

The Family Court:
An Historical Survey

T

he New York Family Court
this year celebrates its
twenty-fifth anniversary. 1
Hailed as an "experimental"
tribunal, designed to resolve
society's most intractable problems,
including family dissolution, delinquency and child negled, the court
has been perceived as a radical
development which altered the then
existing legal rules governing family
affairs.2 The Family Court Act indeed incorporates several creative
provisions. But the court's foundations were built upon solid
jurisprudential underpinnings, principles which had evolved over the
course of the preceding century.
Establishment of the court was
neither radical nor experimental; in
reality, Family Court represents the
latest increment in the development
of legal principles to protect
children and adjudicate family
disputes. In view of the controversies which have surrounded the
court since its inception, an
historical silver anniversary analysis
may be helpful.
At common law and through at
least the first generation of of the
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nineteenth century, legal priciples of
nonintervention were applied to
children and families. Criminal prosecution of a child less than fourteen
years of age could succeed only if
the prosecution proved, in the
words of Blackstone, "Beyond all
doubt and contradiction" that the
youth could understand the distinction between right and wrong, and
could further understand the consequences of the illegal act. 3 Since the
burden of proof was extremely difficult, there were few reported prosecutions. The principle, which
became known as the infancy
presumption, was applied in New

* Professor of Law, Pace University
1 Constitutionally authorized in 1961, the
court was inaugurated on September 1,1962;
see L. 1962, c.686.
2 For example, the relevant legislative committee commented that the new court " ...
must deal with sensitive and difficult areas of
life about which reasonable men and women
differ. Hence it is necessarily an experimental
court"; State of New York, Joint Legislative
Committee on Court Reorganization, The
Family Court Act p. IX (1962).
3 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on
Laws of England, Book IV, Chapter II, pp.
23-24 (1723-1780); emphasis added.

53

York throughout the nineteenth century. 4 Even the older child was ordinarily spared the extreme common law punishments; for example,
an 1823 official New York criminal
law reporter commented that "the
lowest period, that judgement of
death has been inflicted upon an infant in the United States, has never
extended below sixteen years ... ".5
Child protective laws were nonexistent: parental discretion reigned
supreme, precluding legal action for
eVen extreme child abuse or neglect.
The doctrine of nonintervention
began to be compromised as the
nineteenth century progressed. With
the virtual abolition of capital and
corporal punishment in 1796, and
the substitution of long-term incarceration, New York's reformers
soon perceived the need for juvenile
treatment and rehabilitation. 6 In
1824 the legislature incorporated the
House of Refuge to receive" all such
children [under sixteen years of age 1
as shall be convicted of criminal offenses, in any city or county of this
state, and as may in the judgment of
the court, before whom any such offender shall be tried, be deemed proper objects". 7 Modeled after the then
novel penitentiary system, children
were committed to the House of
Refuge until majority. Although
committment was discretionary,
most children who were convicted
were henceforth placed in the
special juvenile facility (given the infancy presumption, the predominant age population was probably
fourteen through sixteen).
Child protective legislation
evolved somewhat later. Although a
Juvenile Asylum to house impoverished young children was
legialatively incorporated in 1851, 8
and the. Children's Aid Society was
founded in 1853 to "rescue" immigrant children from streets and
poorhouses through placement in
foster homes or farm apprenticeships/ major legislative reform
was a post-Civil War development.
The late nineteenth century
witnessed great social and familial
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upheaval. First, extreme civil war
casualty and desertion rates caused
extensive family dislocation. Next,
the Industrial Revolution removed
children from farm environments,
where extended family assistance
was available, to city slums. Both
parents, and frequently the child,
were employed long hours. Last,
large waves of immigration, caused
in part by industrializatrion,
brought impoverished alien children
to the streets of New York. An
organized effort to protect children
from unwhoesome, "unAmerican"
environments,
subsequently
characterized as the "Childsavers"
movement, quickly took root.
Motivated by increasingly inhuman
housing and employment conditions, as well as an anti-immigrant
bias, the movement succeeded in
obtaining the passage of radical
legislation. Between 1865 and 1885 a
series of child protective statutes,
followed by the legislative incorporation of religious and nonsec-
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tarian child care agencies, altered
profoundly the legal relationships
between children, their parents, and
the state.
In 1865 the legislature enacted
the "Disorderly Child" Act,lO a
statute roughly equivalent to the
present status offense or PINS
4 See, e.g., Garrett Walker's Case, 5 New
York City Hall Recorder 137 (1820);
however, the Blackstonian principle of
beyond all doubt and contradiction was
altered to beyond a reasonable doubt. The
la~t ft;ported case in this state involving applIcatIOn of the presumption is People v.
Squazza, 40 Misc. 71, 81 N.Y.S. 254 (Ct. of
Gen. Sessions, N.Y. Co. 1903).

5 Note following People v. William Teller
and Jason Teller, 1 Wheeler's Criminal Cases
231,232.
'

6 See L.1796, c.30, which abolished corporal punishment, forfeiture and capital
punishment except for murder and treason.
7 L.1824, c. 126, as amended by L.1826,

c.24.
8

L.1851, c.232.

9 See First Annual Report
Aid Society, 1854, pp. 3-4.
10 L.1865, c.ln.
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legislation; for the first time a child
could be commited for non-criminal
behavior. Twelve years later the
legislature passed an "Act for Protecting Children", a measure which
could be characterized as the state's
first child neglect law. 11 By 1880 the
contemporary triad of major
juvenile justice causes of action,
delinquency, status offense and
neglect, were statutorily in place. 12
The new legislation, which truly
was experimental, was refined and
codified in 1881 when the state
enacted a comprehensive new Penal
Code.
In addition, a plethora of child
care agencies and soCieties for the
prevention of cruelty to children
were legislatively incorporated, and
were granted the authority to
receive court commitments.
Simultaneously, the legislature,
reflecting the policy of nonincarceration dating from 1824,
gradually decriminalized youthful
anti-sodal behavior. A 1905 act
stipulated that "The commission by
a child under the age of sixteen years
of a crime, not capital or punishable
by life imprisonment, which if committed by an adult would be a
felony, renders such child guilty of a
misdemeanor only ... ",13 Four years
later, the word "misdemeanor" was
changed to the newly coined term
"juvenile delinquency" .14 Thereafter, and until the enactment of the
1978 Juvenile Offender Act, any act
short of murder committed by a
youngster under the age of sixteen
could not be deemed a crime.
All the measures outlined above
were enacted as part of the Penal
Law and were applied by the
criminal courts. Faced with an increasing burden of child protective
and delinquency cases, the judiciary
understandably moved to segregate
children's cases. The development
of unique juvenile justice standards,
such as confidentiality and probation services, further contributed to
the need for a specialized judicial
structure. Through amendment to
the New York City Charter,

separate children's parts of the
criminal court were established in
1901;15 within a decade children's
parts were common throughout
every urban area. Finally, in 1921
the state, joining what by then had
become a national movement, completed the divorce between juvenile
and criminal courts through the
adoption of a constitutional amendment authorizing the establishment
of separate children's courts or
domestic relations courts for each
county.16
Prior to 1922, juvenile justice
had jurisdictionally and jurisprudentially constituted a part of
the criminal law. Hence the full
panoply of criminal due process
rules applied (although the rigorous
rules may have been relaxed in practice). The children's courts,
however, were not statutorily
bound by the Criminal Procedure
Law. Litigation to determine procedural boundaries resulted. In
1927, the Court of Appeals held that
crimi'1al due process standards
nevertheless applied to delinquency
actions:
There must be a trial; the charge against
the child cannot be sustained upon mere
hearsay or surmise; the child must first
have committed the act of burglary or of
larceny before it can be convicted of being
a delinquent child. The act remains the
same and the proof of the act is equally
necessary whether we call it burglary,
larceny or delinquency. The name may
change the result; it cannot change the
facts.
Our activities in bahalf of the child may
have been awakened, but the fundamental ideas of criminal procedure have not
changed. These require a definite charge,
a hearing, competent proof and a judgment. Anything less is arbitrary powerP

But a mere four years later, the
same court held that criminal due
process rules no longer applied, ef~
fectively overruling the 1927 decision: "Since the [delinquency 1 proceeding was not a criminal one,
there was neither right to nor
necessity for the procedural
safeguards described by constitution
and statute in criminal cases."18 The

NEW YORK STATE BAR JOURNAL JUL Y 1988
HeinOnline -- 60 N.Y. St. B.J. 55 1988

informality and absence of procedural rights, which became
synonymous with Juvenile Justice,
dated only from 1932.
Such is the legacy of the Family
Court, at least in synopsis form.
The framework which today
governs juvenile justice and child
welfare proceedings was formulated
throughout the nineteenth century
and was largely completed by 1880.
Organizationally, the Family
Court's predecessors were the
children's courts (and the New York
City Domestic Relations Court) and
the earlier children's parts of the
criminal courts. Procedurally, traditional principles prevailed, at least
in the main, until 1932. The Family
Court was not made from whole
cloth, was not "experimental", and
did not substantially alter society's
treatment of delinquency, child
neglect or other manifestations of
family dysfunction. The founders
prudently built upon a long evolution, augmenting pre-existing
jurisdiction (adding, for example,
family offenses, though declining to
grant the Family Court divorce
jurisdiction) and strengthening the
crucial Family Court dispositional
process.
Continued on Page 78

1.1877, c.428; another milestone in the
development of children's laws was adoption,
enacted in 1873 (L.1873,c.830).
12 Of course, the early statutes were
significantly different than their modern
counterparts: see Sobie, The Creation of
Juvenile Justice: A History of New York's
Children's Laws, New York Bar Foundation
(1987), pp. 43-53.
13 L.1905, c.699.
14 L.1909, c.478

11

15

L.1901, c.466; the requirement of separate
court.parts was initially limited to Manhattan
and the Bronx.
16 The implementation was achieved through
the Children's Court Act of New York State
(1.1922, c.547) and the New York City
Children's Court Act (L.1924, c.254).
17 People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 313,
316.
18 People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 177 (1932);
a strong dissent was filed by Judge Crane,
who had written the 1927 Fitzgerald opinion.
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This is not to belittle the
achievements which we justly
celebrate. 1962 should be heralded
as the year a state-wide court
capable of adjudicating most
disputes involving the family was
finally established. So too, this year
marks the silver anniversary of affording counsel to children, a
measure which New York pioneered
through the enactment of Family
Court Act Article Two. 19 Other
1962 accomplishments include the
re-introduction of procedural standards and enactment of the first
modern child protective act. 20
Twenty-five years of experience,
legislation and caselaw development
has resulted in an even stronger
juvenile justice system.
Much remains to be done. 21
Much remains controversial. Surely, the rules governing the adjudication" and disposition of complex
emotional, familial and societal problems is one subject in which
reasonable people may differ. The
bar, the bench and every concerned
citizen should be proud of the
achievements, should explore and
debate reasonable alternatives, and
should never lose sight of the court's
rich history, traditions and potential.
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See §§241-249.

q

Family Court Act Article Three, now Article Ten; the 1962 Act was the first in which
the parent was deemed the "respondent" and
the court could order a wide array of child
protective measures.
21 For example, the court has received
neither the resources nor the prestige it needs
and deserves; to cite another example, the
representation of children remains inadequate in several areas of the state.
20
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